

# Crash Narratives

Dasol Kim  
Office of Financial Research  
[Dasol.Kim@ofr.treasury.gov](mailto:Dasol.Kim@ofr.treasury.gov)

William N. Goetzmann  
Yale School of Management  
[william.goetzmann@yale.edu](mailto:william.goetzmann@yale.edu)

Robert J. Shiller  
Yale University  
[robert.shiller@yale.edu](mailto:robert.shiller@yale.edu)

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## Why These Findings Are Important

The financial press is a conduit for popular narratives that reflect collective memory about historical events. Investors may seek a framework to contextualize rare events, and narratives in the media may offer one. Comparisons to past catastrophes make salient the gravity of current events and focus public attention on a singular narrative about what the future may bring. The paper provides evidence that narratives about stock market crashes propagate broadly once they appear in news articles, and it shows the strong effects of such narratives on investor belief formation.

## Key Findings

1

### Crash narratives directly affect investor crash belief.

Investor crash probabilities are elevated following the appearance of crash narratives the previous day.

2

### Crash narratives prime investor crash concerns and, in turn, market feedback.

Crash narratives that appear in the financial press have a positive and significant association with attention to stock market crashes, as indicated in internet search volumes.

3

### The financial press is more likely to employ narratives in certain situations.

The press tends to employ narratives when it wants to make the financial news more accessible, when there is high public attention to the stock market, and when readership is more diverse.

## Methodology

Using recent advances in computational linguistics, the authors developed a higher-order measure of narrativity based on newspaper articles that appeared in the days following the 1987 and 1929 crashes.

The authors used investor survey data to “look under the hood” at the effects of narratives on investor beliefs. Specifically, they examined the effects of crash narratives on investor crash beliefs. Additionally, the authors found evidence that investors repeat language found in newspaper articles related to crash narratives when asked to describe general stock market conditions.

To differentiate alternative explanations for the results, the authors construct a pure measure of narrativity based on classical folktales published almost two centuries ago. The authors found a strong correspondence between the crash narrative measure and the pure narrativity measure, affirming the interpretation that the crash narrative measure is capturing narrativity rather than fundamental factors.

# CRASH NARRATIVES\*

William N. Goetzmann<sup>1</sup>

Dasol Kim<sup>2</sup>

Robert J. Shiller<sup>3</sup>

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## Abstract

The financial press is a conduit for popular narratives that reflect collective memory about historical events. Some collective memories relate to major stock market crashes, and investors may rely on associated narratives, or *crash narratives*, to inform their current beliefs and choices. Using recent advances in computational linguistics, we develop a higher-order measure of narrativity based on newspaper articles that appear following major crashes. We provide evidence that crash narratives propagate broadly once they appear in news articles and significantly explain predictive variation in market volatility. We exploit investor heterogeneity using survey data to distinguish the effects of narrativity and fundamental conditions and find consistent evidence. Finally, we develop a measure of pure narrativity to examine when the financial press is more likely to employ narratives.

**Keywords:** Narrative finance, crash beliefs, investor surveys

**JEL codes:** E03, G00, G02, G11, G23

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<sup>1</sup> William N. Goetzmann; Yale School of Management (corresponding author), Email: [william.goetzmann@yale.edu](mailto:william.goetzmann@yale.edu)

<sup>2</sup> Dasol Kim; Office of Financial Research, Email: [dasol.kim@ofr.treasury.gov](mailto:dasol.kim@ofr.treasury.gov). The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent official positions or policy of the Office of Financial Research or the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

<sup>3</sup> Robert J. Shiller; Yale University, Email: [robert.shiller@yale.edu](mailto:robert.shiller@yale.edu)

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## 1. Introduction

Precisely because stock market crashes are infrequent, the history of past events, whether personally experienced or not, plays a crucial role in the assessment of extreme crash probabilities. Rare-disaster concerns and the probabilistic assessment of them have been posed as an explanation for various findings in asset pricing.<sup>4</sup> Yet most people experience only a handful of extreme market shocks in their lifetimes, but of course, they learn about others in various ways—the financial press being one important source. In this paper, we explore the role of collective memory—represented by narratives—in belief formation about rare disasters. Shiller (2017) highlights the important role of narratives in the transmission of economic beliefs. Narratives act as a social medium through which an idea can spread rapidly through conversation and potentially affect aggregate beliefs about asset prices.<sup>5</sup>

In nonliterate cultures, collective memory is carried by stories, myths, and folktales. In interviews with the Ongee people of Little Andaman Island following the catastrophic tsunami of 2004, Pandya (2005) learned that native Andamans largely avoided the disaster because of a traditional story about the conflict between the living and spirits of the dead. The withdrawal of the ocean immediately before the tsunami was a sign for people to flee to high ground because “angry spirits would come down to hunt us.” The danger signal was embedded in a narrative that was compelling enough to be passed down through generations—in Shiller (1984) terms, it was *infectious*. More recent settlers on these remote islands retained no such tradition and suffered from the disaster in far greater proportion. The account of the Andaman Islanders highlights not only the role of collective memory as a potentially life-preserving mechanism, but also the relevance of narrative devices such as plot, characters, and disequilibrium in the maintenance and stimulus of collective memory.

Historically, newspapers have acted as an important vehicle for the spread of ideas. Newspaper articles are stories that collate facts related to current events. Their narrativity relates to the manner in which those facts are presented, affecting how they are interpreted and contextualized by readership. When large shocks to the financial markets occur, historical References often play a role in news stories. The role of the financial press as a mechanism for

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Reitz (1988), Barro (2006), Berkman et. al. (2011), Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), Goetzmann, Kim, and Shiller (2020), Santa-Clara and Yan (2010), Wachter (2013), Welch (2015), and Weitzmann (2007).

<sup>5</sup> Shiller (1984) argues that the existence of smart-money investors in the economy will not entirely mitigate the effects of market participation by average investors who are subject to fads and fashions.

collective memory is potentially important. Comparisons to past catastrophes make salient the gravity of current events and focus public attention on a singular narrative about what the future may bring.

For example, the stock market crash of October 19, 1987, is an event that represents the largest one-day decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) Index since the stock market crash of October 24, 1929. Figure 1 displays monthly counts of references in *The Wall Street Journal* to the crashes of October 24, 1929, and October 19, 1987.<sup>6</sup> Notice that the biggest spike in references to the crash of '29 occurred in October 1987. Journalists the day after the '87 crash immediately invoked the specter of the Great Depression.<sup>7</sup> In the years that followed, however, the crash of October '87—which was larger in magnitude than that of 1929—came to dominate historical crash references. The pattern in Figure 1 is unmistakable: references to past crashes clearly varied with market conditions and were frequently associated with big drops in stock prices.

For readers who did not experience the crash of 1987 personally, the financial press renewed awareness of this specific event more than 2,000 times in the years that followed. A natural question is whether and how this collective-memory mechanism affected investor attitudes and beliefs. Press references to the 1987 crash and the 1929 crash were embedded in rich, written narratives designed to interest and engage readers. Simple counts tell us very little about this narrative content.

We posit that investors use narratives to inform their beliefs and, in turn, their choices. Narratives often elicit causal relationships between a sequence of events connecting one state to another, as well as things that happen in between. They thus suggest an analogy for how and why things are happening and what the future outcome might be. Investors may be especially influenced by narratives related to rare events, such as stock market crashes, compared to common ones. The psychology literature provides evidence that individuals are susceptible to a variety of behavioral

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<sup>6</sup> We search the Eastern Edition of the *Wall Street Journal* in ProQuest from January 1984 to April 2022 on the terms “1929 crash,” “crash of 1929,” “Black Thursday,” “1987 crash,” “crash of 1987,” and “Black Monday.” Note that the terms “Black Monday” and “Black Thursday” have been occasionally used to describe other events, so there is some noise in these counts.

<sup>7</sup> “The Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted an astonishing 508 points, or 22.6%, to 1738.74. The drop far exceeded the 12.8% decline on the notorious day of Oct. 28, 1929, which is generally considered the start of the Great Depression.” Quote taken from “The Crash of '87: Stocks Plummet 508.32 Amid Panicky Selling—Percentage Decline Is Far Steeper Than '29; Bond Prices Surge.” Tim Metz, Alan Murray, Thomas E. Ricks and Beatrice E. Garcia. *Wall Street Journal*, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. 20 Oct 1987: 1.

biases in evaluating low-probability events.<sup>8</sup> Investors may seek a framework to alleviate or contextualize rare events, and narratives conveyed by media may offer one. This suggests not only a role for the financial press in the propagation of narratives, but also a mechanism for aggregate market feedback. Investors may seek a framework to alleviate or contextualize rare events, and narratives conveyed by media may offer one. This suggests not only a role for the financial press in the propagation of narratives, but also a mechanism for aggregate market feedback.

To test this hypothesis, we develop a higher-order measure of news narrativity specifically related to major crashes. Detecting narrativity requires estimating structural relationships within highly unstructured data. Recent advances in computational linguistics allow us to quantify distributed representations of these relationships using high-dimensional semantic space models. We extract narratives that appeared in the news in the days following the 1987 and 1929 crashes, and we estimate their prevalence in news articles each day for over 30 years. We argue that this measure captures crash narratives in the media. We show that the measure corresponds with major market events throughout the sample period, including the LTCM collapse, 9/11, the Great Financial Crisis, the European Debt Crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic. This suggests that journalists broadly employ narratives used following the 1987 crash in spite of differences in contexts. The measure has a significant relationship with lagged, market-based crash indicators in the post-1987 period. Manual inspection suggests that these patterns are unlikely to be driven by the prevalence of specific words alone, but rather by the sequencing and distribution of words representing narrative structure.

Our first set of tests provides suggestive evidence that the prevalence of crash narratives in the media explains a significant amount of predictive variation in investor attention to stock market crashes and market volatility. *Crash attention* is defined as the daily internet search volumes for broad-based crash-related terms. We do not focus on terms related to individual stocks because the crash narrative measure is likely capturing aggregate market crash concerns. We find that crash narratives that appear the previous day have a positive and significant association with crash attention. These tests isolate variation to daily innovations in crash attention and account for potential biases due to serial correlations in the market-based controls. The effects almost double in magnitude when conditioning on periods of high general stock market attention, which squares with received wisdom. These results suggest broad propagation of crash narratives in the financial

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. Barberis (2013).

press. They also suggest that crash narratives prime investor crash concerns, and, in turn, market feedback—that is, narratives have a positive and significant association with future VIX levels. However, crash narratives do not have a statistically significant estimated effect on future market returns.

A potential issue with the crash attention tests is that they may not necessarily be attributable to investors because we cannot identify internet search volumes by individual users. Additionally, in spite of a large battery of controls, it is difficult to rule out the potential influence of unobservable fundamental heterogeneity unaccounted for by the models. We address these concerns by using investor survey data to directly examine the effects of crash narratives on subjective crash assessments and exploit investor heterogeneity to directly account for potential omitted factors. We argue that fundamental factors should affect individual and institutional investor beliefs similarly. However, we also expect that susceptibility to the influence of crash narratives should decrease in investor sophistication.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, we test for differential effects of crash narratives on individual investors relative to institutional investors.

We find evidence that crash narratives directly affect investor crash beliefs. Investor crash probabilities are elevated following the appearance of crash narratives the previous day. There is no effect for institutional investors, but there is a positive and significant effect for individual investors. We go further by decomposing the crash narrative measure according to the position where the narratives appear in the articles. Specifically, we differentiate narratives that appear in the lede from those that appear in non-lede paragraphs. Given that readers are more likely to read the lede paragraph compared with other parts of the article, we are able to conduct tests based on intra-article variation in salience. We find consistent effects for lede paragraph crash narratives, even when controlling for crash narratives that appear in other parts of the article. Finally, we show that investors' own narratives, provided in response to open survey questions, echo crash narratives in the financial press.

In the final set of tests, we examine periods when journalists are more likely to employ general narrativity. For these tests, we construct a pure measure of narrativity using information that is plausibly exogenous to financial market conditions. Specifically, we construct narrative

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<sup>9</sup> Experimental evidence from the social psychology literature suggests that the prevalence of various biases is pronounced when individuals perceive that they have low expertise (Ottati and Isbell (1996), Sedikides (1995)) or low processing capacity (Greifeneder and Bless (2007), Siemer and Reisenzein (1998)).

measures based on classical folktales published almost two centuries prior to our sample period. The pure narrativity measure is based on the similarity in semantic distributions between those folktales and each article in the sample. We find a strong correspondence between the crash narrative measure and the pure narrativity measure, affirming our interpretation of the crash narrative measure. We also show that business journalists are more likely to employ general narratives during periods of high general stock market attention. This is consistent with the view that narratives make the news more accessible and are therefore more likely to be used during periods when readership is more diverse. Finally, we show that the pure narrativity measure has a similar effect on investor crash beliefs. A decomposition of the measure allows us to attribute the effect to the component associated with the crash narrative measure.

## *1.1 Related Literature*

### *1.1.1 Narrative*

Despite its obvious centrality to human society, *narrative* is difficult to precisely define. Bruner (1991) argues that the primary way humans make sense of the world is through stories. Narrative scholars often define narratives as a constellation of specific characteristics. For example, Herman (2009) lists four key features of a narrative: it involves the act of telling, it represents a sequence of events that involve disequilibrium, it involves context (a world within which the sequence takes place), and it evokes a sense of experiencing or living through the events. Different narrative scholars emphasize some of these features more than others. Lively (2019) highlights the narrative act. Kermode (1967) highlights plot.

The use of natural language processing (NLP) in the humanities has stimulated the development of analytical methods to detect degrees of *narrativity*. For example, Piper et. al. (2021) train a machine-learning model on a sample of historical texts scored by readers on narrative characteristics and construct a canonical corpus with a narrativity indicator. As expected, genres over centuries differed significantly in narrativity: fiction and poetry scored high in narrativity, while science and nonfiction scored low.

Recently, some researchers have applied language-processing tools to explore topical content and sentiment in financial news. Manela and Moreira (2017) used textual analysis to construct a news-implied proxy for the VIX fear index from *The Wall Street Journal* (WSJ)

headlines and test their correlation to collective uncertainty. Bybee et al. (2022) extracted topic models from WSJ news articles and found that news attention to topics explains a significant proportion of stock returns. Similarly, Bertesch et. al. (2021) tested the Shiller (2017) hypothesis about fluctuating narratives in the business cycle. Larsen et. al. (2021) documented the effect of news on inflation expectations. Dierckx et al. (2021) identified narratives in the financial press that forecast implied market volatility. Our work differs from these papers by focusing on two factors: the degree of narrativity in the text and the narrative mechanism of historical recall.

One of the challenges in our analysis is to distinguish between topical and pure narrativity. We address this in two ways. First, we test whether noncontextual models (i.e., bag-of-words analysis) identify relationships that the contextual Doc2Vec model has identified. Second, we use a high-narrativity text corpus—folk motifs derived from an archetypal corpus of fairy tales—that is completely unrelated in topic to financial and economic news. Propp’s *Morphology of the Folktale* (1968) pioneered a structural approach to identifying recurring motifs. It used plot structures in traditional Russian folktales, and folklore scholars have since refined this approach to study the structure and function of folktales.<sup>10</sup> The stories in *Grimm’s Fairy Tales* (1812) are widely used as archetypal narrative corpora.<sup>11</sup> We construct a folk-motif narrativity metric from a classification of *Grimm’s Fairy Tales* and use it as an instrument for narrativity.

### 1.1.2 Rare Disasters

Tsai and Wachter (2015) review the re-emergence of attention to rare-disaster risk in asset pricing, particularly focusing on dynamic models that have been proposed and tested.<sup>12</sup> Reitz (1988) and Barro (2006) show how rational rare-disaster concerns could explain the equity premium puzzle. Recently, researchers have increased focus on mechanisms through which beliefs about rare disasters can form. Bordalo et. al. (2021) show how selective recall can induce overestimation of the probability of unlikely events. Enke et. al. (2020) provide experimental evidence in support of the memory channel. Goetzmann, Kim, and Shiller (2022) find that the affect heuristic documented by Johnson and Tversky (1983) plays a role in crash probability assessment

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. Thompson (1989) and Wurtzback (1997), for example.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Garry (2017).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Reitz (1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2008), Wachter (2013), Tsai and Wachter (2015), Manela and Moreira (2016).

and that it is mediated by financial press sentiment. Van Binsbergen et. al. (2022) model the belief formation process in a Bayesian framework and show how biased beliefs can form when crashes fail to occur in a small sample.

### 1.1.3 Memory

Our work also relates to research on memory as a mechanism for directing attention. Kahana (2012) summarizes the considerable experimental evidence that human memory works according to a few basic rules that together are referred to as *retrieved context*. Retrieved context relies on a few operators: recency, semantic similarity, and temporal contiguity. *Recency* refers to humans relying on more recent events when accessing memory. *Semantic similarity* refers to humans accessing events that are like those they are currently experiencing or asked to recall. *Temporal contiguity* refers to humans accessing a memory through broader contextual similarities.

Memory models have had considerable recent influence on research in behavioral economics. For example, Mullainathan (2002) proposes an associative-memory mechanism by which current news triggers selective memories of past events. The model generates biased forecasts based upon the degree of selectivity. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) demonstrate that a bounded-memory heuristic leads to “local thinking” that reduces the state space from which probabilistic beliefs are formed. Bordalo et. al. (2017) show how an associative-memory framework can explain a variety of behavioral biases. In an experimental setting, Enke et. al. (2019) test key implications of associative memory for imperfect forecasting and verify the key hypothesis that associative memory can induce overreaction to news. Vector space representations of text are based on ensembles of contextual associations of words extracted from large text corpuses. They have been studied as a computational analog to human judgement processes, which rely on contextual associations of words and ideas. Bhatia (2017), for example, demonstrates that vector space models, similar to those used in this paper, can mimic documented prediction fallacies used in judgement under uncertainty.

Wachter and Kahana (2019) show how a model based on contextual association and retrieval can shape expectations and influence asset prices. Goetzmann, Watanabe, and Watanabe (2022) test the Wachter and Kahana model on a panel of macroeconomic forecasters and find that the contextual similarity of macroeconomic conditions to past states significantly predicted forecasts of the stock market.

One of the challenges to testing the asset-pricing implications of memory models is that while such models describe individual behavior, asset prices are driven by aggregate supply and demand. In memory models, current news triggers access to personal memory, which in turn affects beliefs. This indexing process need not be limited to personal recall. One need not have lived through the 1929 stock market crash to “recall” it via its contextual and semantic similarity to contemporary economic events, particularly if the news points out the similarities. Reference to a common narrative corpus like the news can address this challenge. While personally experienced past events may be more salient, events “experienced” by hearing or reading about them can be subject to the same process of accessing past events via contextual association. In this case, reading or hearing a story about an event substitutes for personally experiencing it and thus can still potentially affect prediction via the same proposed recall mechanisms.

The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides details on the methodology. Section 3 presents the results for the crash attention and market outcome tests. Section 4 presents the tests based on the survey data. Section 5 describes the methodology for the pure narrativity measure and presents the results of the narrativity tests. Section 6 concludes.

## **2. Data and Measure Construction**

### *2.1 Data Sources*

We use ProQuest to search the Eastern Edition of the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) from January 1, 1987, through December 31, 2020. This is the only edition available on ProQuest for that period. We assume that it corresponds reasonably well to the national edition.<sup>13</sup> We search articles containing words and phrases associated with the stock market, yielding a total of 189,921 articles with a word count of at least 200.<sup>14</sup> We download the full text of these articles, their headlines, their lede paragraphs, and (for a subset) their topic tags.

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<sup>13</sup> Data for the 1987 through 2015 period were collected during the weeks of May 17 through June 11 of 2016. Data for the 2016 through 2020 period were collected during the weeks of July 11 through December 5 of 2021.

<sup>14</sup> The ProQuest search term used to identify the articles is “(stock NEAR/5 market) OR SU(stock) OR SU(securities).” We did not use broader search terms, such as “SU(markets),” because they yielded articles on other asset markets, such as for bonds and commodities.

We also use ProQuest to download images of articles that appear in the WSJ from October 15, 1929, through October 31, 1929. The data available are digitized images of the main section. All articles that appear in the main section are manually transcribed. This process yields the full text and headlines for a total of 663 articles published during this period.

For stock market data, we use daily data on the value-weighted index of the NYSE-AMEX-Nasdaq-Arca universe from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from January 2, 1987, through December 31, 2020. The daily returns of each index are used to empirically measure market volatility and the occurrence of extreme events. Market volatility implied by the OEX and VIX is obtained from the Chicago Board Options Exchange from January 2, 1987, through December 31, 2020. Daily closing values for OEX are used through December 29, 1989, after which, the VIX is used for the remainder of the sample period. Option-implied crash probabilities based on the S&P 500 are constructed using the methodology of Martin (2017) from January 4, 1996, through December 31, 2020.

In order to capture investor attention, we collect daily data on internet search volumes related to stock market crashes from January 2004 to December 2020. Da, Engleberg, and Gao (2011) argue that search volume measures the attention of individual investors. In our application of this measure, search volumes may be indicative of individual investor attention to crashes, which, in turn, may influence beliefs in the likelihood of a stock market crash.<sup>15</sup> Individuals may search for general terms related to a stock market crash if they are concerned about broader, market-wide trends, as opposed to idiosyncratic price movements of individual stocks. We construct an analogous measure of general stock market attention that is also used in the analysis.

Robert Shiller's Stock Market Confidence Indices are based on survey data collected continuously since 1989—semiannually for a decade and then monthly by the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management since July 2001. Shiller (2000a) describes the indices constructed from these surveys, compares them to other sentiment indicators, and studies their dynamics in the aggregate. In this paper, we use the disaggregated survey responses

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<sup>15</sup> We download daily search volume indices using the Google Trends API. We restrict searches to the finance category. We cannot request daily data for the full sample period because calls to the API using daily frequency are limited, so we download overlapping, 9-month subsamples that span the full period. The values of the search index are specific to each subsample, so they need to be adjusted in order to make them comparable to other subsamples. We address this issue by adjusting the daily values using the monthly frequency data, which are not affected by this issue. We adjust the daily values based on monthly averages to match with the monthly values. The overlapping periods are then averaged, resulting in the time-consistent series.

used to construct those indices. About 300 questionnaires each month are mailed to individuals identified by a market survey firm as high-net-worth investors and institutional investors. They may fill it in when they wish, but they are asked to mark the date on which they complete the survey. It is not a longitudinal survey. Each month composes a different sample of respondents, and the sampling goal is to have 20 to 50 responses per month from each of the two investor types—individual and institutional. The combined sample used in this paper contains 13,555 responses.

The current study focuses on responses to the following survey question:

*“What do you think is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash in the U. S., like that of October 28, 1929, or October 19, 1987, in the next six months, including the case that a crash occurred in the other countries and spreads to the U.S.? (An answer of 0% means that it cannot happen, an answer of 100% means it is sure to happen.)*

*Probability in U. S.: \_\_\_\_\_%*

The phrasing of this question has not been significantly altered during the sample period we examine.<sup>16</sup> Thus, it offers us the advantage of survey data consistency over a long period when the stock market, the macro-economy, and the financial system experienced considerable variation. Additional discussion and analysis related to the survey data can be found in Goetzmann, Kim, and Shiller (2022).

The Stock Market Confidence Index questionnaires have room for additional commentary. A subset of respondents filled these in, and we hand-keyed their written responses. This provides us with narrative data from individual and institutional investors themselves. Notice that the wording of the question is ideal for motivating recall or attention to a rare disaster because it specifically refers to the two largest one-day crashes in U.S. capital market history. Thus, even without any influence from the financial press, we might expect contextual retrieval of knowledge about those two events.

For the construction of folk motifs, we use a classification of *Grimm’s Fairy Tales* according to the Thompson Motif Index (TMI), a widely used classification system to attribute

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<sup>16</sup> This wording has remained the same since 1994. Prior to 1994, the question is phrased as: “What do you think is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash, like that of October 28, 1929, or October 19, 1987, in the next six months?” Only approximately 10% of the observations used in the analysis are associated with the earlier wording. The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of these observations.

motifs to folktales.<sup>17</sup> The advantage of this system is that it allows for multiple motifs to be assigned to the same story. Moreover, the categories are quite granular, though we only use the major categories for simplicity. The complete set of TMI attributions for the corpus comes from *TalesUnlimited.com*. We implemented a web scraper to collect the data.<sup>18</sup>

## 2.2 Crash Narrative Measure Construction

In this section, we explain how we construct a crash narrative score. Because narratives involve sequences, settings, and characters, scoring them requires a modeling tool that captures sequencing and pattern. The most commonly used natural language processing tools, called *bag-of-words* methods, classify documents by word frequencies alone.<sup>19</sup> They do not use sequencing or locational information within a document, except insofar as these leave traces in the types of words that appear.

Recent advances in contextual modeling and computing power offer ways to exploit higher-order linguistic relationships within paragraphs, documents, and corpora. Le and Mikolov (2014) introduce an approach called Doc2Vec that contextualizes words, paragraphs, and documents via a machine-learning algorithm to do such things as predict missing words and classify documents according to higher-order semantics. More specifically, Doc2Vec is an algorithm that captures high-dimensional relationships between the textual units (e.g., words, sentences, paragraphs) by a text vectorization procedure that uses numeric representations of documents within a corpus. In particular, Doc2Vec does not process individual words in isolation but rather constructs context vectors for words and paragraphs in the corpus and uses machine learning to train a predictive algorithm on the multiple contexts in which textual units appear. Thus, it has the potential to do a better job of capturing overall meaning than noncontextual bag-of-words approaches. The class of algorithms that estimate semantic similarity through context vectors have been shown to be effective at higher-level classification of news.<sup>20</sup>

Based on the Doc2Vec approach, we identify articles that have high semantic association

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<sup>17</sup> [https://web.archive.org/web/20220314121400/https://sites.ualberta.ca/~urban/Projects/English/Motif\\_Index.htm](https://web.archive.org/web/20220314121400/https://sites.ualberta.ca/~urban/Projects/English/Motif_Index.htm)

<sup>18</sup> One potential concern is that Grimm's tales in translation may be noisy. Dehghani et. al. (2017) show that neural responses to fairy tales is robust to translation. They also show that Doc2Vec representations of the stories allowed subjects to differentiate them based on neurological (fMRI) responses.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Gentzkow et. al. (2019) for an overview of using text as data in economic research, including bag-of-words methods.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Kim et. al. (2017) and Kabir et. al. (2019) for tests of Doc2Vec methods on news text.

with articles that were published shortly after the two largest one-day crashes in U.S. stock market history: October 24, 1929, and October 19, 1987. The idea is that articles with high similarity based on language used by the press around the 1929 and 1987 stock market crashes, regardless of whether the event was explicitly mentioned in the article, should prime the retrieval of collective and perhaps personal memories associated with the event. We estimate a Doc2Vec model using the WSJ corpus from 1984, and we construct a daily series of average similarity metrics.<sup>21</sup>

The following is a summary of the implementation:

1. We train the Doc2Vec model over all WSJ articles from 1984 to 2020. The vectorization of these articles provides the basis for the estimation of cosine similarity across articles or a daily corpus of articles.
2. For each article over the sample period, we calculate the average cosine similarity for each article to articles published in *The Wall Street Journal* between October 20 and 23, 1987.
3. Vernacular and other structural aspects of writing styles are likely to have evolved over the sample period. That is, two articles may differ substantially due to factors unrelated to narrativity. We address this issue by adjusting the similarity calculations in (2) based on the average cosine similarity for each article to articles appearing in the WSJ from October 5, 1987, through October 9, 1987. The adjusted similarity is defined as the difference between the natural log of one plus the average cosine similarities.
4. For each day, we calculate the average adjusted similarity across articles, and we refer to this quantity as *'87 Narrative*.

It is useful to consider an example of texts with high and low cosine similarity scores. Below, we take an article from September 16, 2008, and we find the best and worst matches among articles published on October 20, 1987—the day following the 21% single-day crash. We note that none of the articles include the term *crash*.

The following is the article from September 16, 2008:

*If you learn nothing else from the last few harrowing days, you should learn the difference between what is obvious and what is inevitable.*

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<sup>21</sup> The models were estimated in Python using the *gensim* library. For the analysis presented, the model is trained over 100 iterations based on a feature vector size of 250, a maximum distance of 5, a minimum word frequency of 10 across all articles, a subsampling threshold of  $10^{-5}$ , and a negative sample of 5.

*In the heat of the moment, the two perceptions seem identical. It was obvious that investors would panic as they absorbed the news about Bloody Sunday on Wall Street, so it was inevitable that the market would take a slashing. It was obvious that Lehman Brothers had to go bust, so a bankruptcy filing was inevitable. It was obvious that Merrill Lynch could no longer make it on its own, so it was inevitable that a bigger institution like Bank of America would take it over.*

*But investors—at least individual investors—don't actually panic in times like these. Instead, they freeze. In July (the latest month for which final numbers are available), mutual-fund investors pulled out just \$2.62 of every \$100 they had invested in stock funds. That was less than they took out of bond funds, even though the stock market had just gone through a nauseating summer swoon.*

Of all articles published on October 20, 1987, the following is the article with the *highest* cosine similarity (29%):

*The little investor doesn't know where to turn, although bigger ones are putting up a brave front.*

*"I'm scared," says Julie Ianotti, an executive secretary in Houston. "My stock is my nest egg, for a house or something. Should I sell? Tell me, should I sell?"*

*When Ms. Ianotti's mother suggested the price drop could portend a new depression, the young Ms. Ianotti at first scoffed at the idea. "I said, 'Yeah, sure, Mom. It'll go back up.'" But as the Dow Jones Industrial Average was taking a record plunge yesterday, Ms. Ianotti says she began giving more thought to her mother's stories about subsisting on water and sugar in the Depression.*

Of all articles published on October 20, 1987, the following is the article with the *lowest* cosine similarity (1%).

*IC Industries Inc., expanding a restructuring of the company, said it will buy as much as \$1 billion of its common shares and is considering selling its aerospace unit, valued at more than \$1.5 billion.*

*Karl D. Bays, chairman and chief executive officer, said the moves are being undertaken to focus the company around its most profitable businesses, which include food products, soft-drink bottling, and auto repair. He said the steps aren't related to recent market reports that Minneapolis investors Irwin Jacobs and Carl Pohlad may seek control of the company.*

*In September, IC announced plans to divest its Illinois Central Gulf Railroad unit by distributing shares in the division to IC holders. It estimated the railroad's market value at \$250 million.*

This example highlights the benefit of using a methodology of identifying higher-order document

similarity. While all three articles have characters engaged in a sequence of actions in a setting, the best-matched article feels more like a story; it has a greater sense of urgency.

### 2.3 Summary Statistics

Table 1 displays the variable descriptions used in the analysis and summary statistics.

### 2.4 Time-series Properties of the Crash Narratives Measure

Figure 2 displays the monthly averages of *'87 Narrative* (thick black) and other market-based crash indicators from January 1987 through December 2020. *'87 Narrative* is the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987. The survey-based crash probabilities (red) are from the Shiller survey. The market-based crash indicators include the minimum daily market return for a given month (gray), the volatility of the daily market returns (light blue), the average daily option-based crash probabilities based on Martin (2017) (dark blue), and the average daily VIX (yellow). All measures are standard normalized.

*'87 Narrative* corresponds strongly with the other crash indicators. Notably, the measure exhibits large spikes during exceptional periods of market stress, identified in the text overlaid on the figure, despite contextual differences from the 1987 crash. The seeming incongruity suggests that journalists may employ crash narratives to convey the specter of a crash, irrespective of specific causes. The correlations based on monthly frequency vary from 37.5% for VIX to 39.9% for market returns volatility. The correlation with the survey-based crash probabilities is 46.8%. Interestingly, there are periods when *'87 Narrative* diverges from the market-based indicators; this is particularly true of the 2003–2006 and 2013–2019 periods. These periods are associated with abnormally low volatility conditions. They may reflect concerns expressed by academics and practitioners—in turn, conveyed by financial media—of elevated market risks in spite of low realized volatility.

We next examine the correlation structure between the crash narrative measure and lagged market-based crash indicators based on the daily data. This analysis only uses data for trading days because some of the variables are unavailable for nontrading days. The results are displayed in Panel A of Table 2. The calculations exclude data prior to 1988. The correlations with the lagged volatility measures range from 26.2% to 28.9%, while the correlation with lagged market returns

is negative:  $-8.7\%$ . There is also a significant, positive correlation with lagged market turnover:  $33.8\%$ . Correlations based on 30-day changes in the variables are somewhat weaker, though they are consistent with the results in Panel A. Panel B of Table 2 displays the results. The correlations for changes in the volatility measures range from  $11.5\%$  to  $25.2\%$ . The correlation for the 30-day cumulative market return is  $-2.3\%$ , while the correlation for changes in market turnover is  $9.8\%$ . These results indicate that the crash narrative measure has a strong correspondence with market-based risk, return, fear, and disagreement indicators based on the unconditional correlations.

Table 3 displays the conditional associations based on regression analysis. Again, the calculations exclude data prior to 1988. The regressions include controls for two-way fixed effects to account for day-of-week and month-of-year factors. Columns (1) through (5) display the regression coefficients when including each market-based indicator individually, and they are consistent with the unconditional correlation results. Column (6) includes all the measures in the same model. All of the measures are statistically significant at least at the 1% level. The high degree of collinearity between the measures likely affects some of the estimates, most noticeably the option-implied crash probability coefficient.

Given that the sample spans more than 30 years following the 1987 crash, we perform subperiod analysis to assess how the associations between the crash narrative measure and the market-based indicators change over time. In untabulated results, we find that the associations remain significant throughout the full sample period. Moreover,  $R^2$  is relatively similar across the subperiods. This suggests that the semantic structure (possibly the types of narratives) used during the 1987 crash continues to be used by the financial press, even in the most recent period.

### 3. Crash Attention and Market Dynamics

In this section, we examine whether crash narratives are salient to investors. If so, do they affect aggregate market outcomes? We define *CrashAttention* as the daily search volume index for the search term “stock market crash.” We chose this term given that it is highly correlated with alternative, related search terms.<sup>22</sup>

Figure 3 displays the monthly values of *CrashAttention* (green) and *'87 Narrative* (black). After the large spike in *CrashAttention* in 2008, there were subsequent spikes, particularly in the

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<sup>22</sup> These search terms include “market crash,” “stock crash,” “1987 crash,” “1929 crash,” and others.

2015 through 2020 sample period. This suggests that crash concerns can arise even during periods of market advance. *CrashAttention* is positively correlated with '87 Narratives: 14.2% at the daily frequency. It is also significantly correlated with market-based crash indicators, ranging from 9.5% for option-implied crash probabilities to 13.8% for market returns squared, at the daily frequency. Notice that the *CrashAttention* measure is episodic. Attention to crashes spiked dramatically only about six or seven times during the fifteen-year period but was “out of sight, out of mind” for long periods. This suggests that attention is a potentially important conditioning variable for belief formation.

To assess the predictive power of '87 Narrative on *CrashAttention*, we estimate the following regression model:

$$CrashAttention_t = \alpha_1 \times '87 Narrative_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha_{2,j} \times X_{t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha_{3,j} \times CrashAttention_{t-j} + \phi^{DOW}_t + \phi^{Month}_t + \varepsilon_t. \quad (1)$$

We control for the first five lags of *CrashAttention* to mitigate any spurious associations due to serial correlation in *CrashAttention*. Because '87 Narrative is also correlated with market-based crash indicators, we control for the following in (**X**): VIX, market returns, market returns squared, and market turnover. Most recent values for the controls are used for nontrading days. The first five lags of these variables are included in the model. We control for day-of-week and month effects by including two-way fixed effects in the model. Finally, we use Newey-West standard errors to account for any remaining serial correlation in the residuals that may bias the test statistics.

The results support the hypothesis that attention to the stock market may be a conditioning factor on the effects of crash narratives. If investors' attention to the market is not activated, then they are unlikely to seek out news about the market and, in turn, react to it.<sup>23</sup> As such, we expect the effects of crash narratives to be stronger during periods of high attention to the stock market. We construct a measure of general stock market attention, *StockMarketAttention*, using the daily search volume index for a set of search terms related to the stock market.<sup>24</sup> We augment Equation (1) with *StockMarketAttention* and an interaction term with '87 Narrative in the following manner:

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Bybee et. al. (2022).

<sup>24</sup> Specifically, we restrict searches to the finance category, based on the union of the following search terms: “djia,” “dow jones,” “Nasdaq,” “new york stock exchange,” “nyse,” “stocks,” “s&p,” and “sp500.”

$$\begin{aligned}
CrashAttention_t = & \beta_1 \times '87 Narrative_{t-1} + \beta_2 \times StockMarketAttention_{t-1} \\
& + \beta_3 \times '87 Narrative_{t-1} \times StockMarketAttention_{t-1} \\
& + \sum_{j=1}^5 \beta_{4,j} \times X_{t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^5 \beta_{5,j} \times CrashAttention_{t-j} + \kappa^{DOW}_t + \\
& \kappa^{Month}_t + \eta_t.
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

These tests allow us to assess whether the effects of crash narratives are larger during periods when high investor attention via the coefficient on interaction term is positive ( $\beta_3 > 0$ ).

### 3.1 Results

Table 4 displays the results. Column (1) presents the results from univariate tests. The coefficient for *'87 Narrative* is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level ( $\beta_1$  estimate = 29.00). The specification for Column (2) includes the interaction terms with *StockMarketAttention*. The coefficients on both the uninteracted ( $\beta_2$  estimate = 35.07) and interacted ( $\beta_3$  estimate = 5.50 *'87 Narrative* terms are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for the uninteracted *StockMarketAttention* term is also statistically significant. The results suggest that the media crash narratives are predictive of investor attention to stock market crashes, and the effects are stronger during periods when investors are already paying attention to stock market news. Column (3) repeats the tests in Column (2) but also includes controls for fundamental conditions when crash concerns are likely to be higher. The results are qualitatively similar and remain significant, though the point estimates attenuate. To control for the strong right-skew of *CrashAttention*, we examine an alternative specification that maps *CrashAttention* to a dummy, where nonzero values are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise, in order to determine whether distributional asymmetry is driving significance. Column (4) displays the results, which are consistent with those of Column (3).

The types of narratives used by financial media have likely evolved through time. Older narratives may be unfamiliar to modern audiences and so may lack salience. They may also be less salient because they are simply removed in time. We directly evaluate this conjecture by repeating the analysis in Table 4 using the crash narrative measure based on the October 1929

stock market crash, or *'29 Narrative*.

The 1987 and 1929 crash narrative measures exhibit a strong positive association. Figure 4 displays the results for monthly averages. The correlation between the two measures is 49.2% at a monthly frequency and 48.2% at a daily frequency. This suggests a common, long-lived component in narratives used in articles published in 1929 and 1987. There are also some interesting differences. *'29 Narrative* displays a more episodic pattern compared to *'87 Narrative*. It spiked after the Dot-com bubble and the 2008 financial crisis, but it dropped between the two events and has also dropped since 2016. Recall of the earlier crash was less sustained than recall of the more recent one.

Table 5 displays the results for a specification similar to that in Table 4. The coefficients for *'29 Narrative* are positive and statistically significant in the specifications without the control variables, though they are two to three times smaller compared to those for *'87 Narrative* in Table 4. Additionally, the interaction term is statistically insignificant at the 10% level. With the inclusion of the control variables, the coefficients for the *'29 Narrative* terms become insignificant. These results support the hypothesis that more recent events in time are more salient. Recency in this case may be a function of attention due to lived experience or due to the financial press's selective, episodic attention to 1929.

The different effects of the *'29 Narrative* and the *'87 Narrative* on crash attention are interesting in that the former preceded the Great Depression and the latter had few knock-on effects. The market mostly recovered by the end of the year, and the Dot-com bubble burst more than two years later. One might expect that 1929 would attract the attention of those concerned about the economic consequences of a crash. The *'87 Narrative* in the years that followed may be a story of disaster and recovery. Differences in narrative effects may reflect differences in outcomes.

### 3.2 Market Outcomes

We next examine whether crash narratives affect market volatility and returns. The results from the crash attention tests suggest that financial media narratives are salient. However, it is unclear whether the effects are sufficiently powerful to affect market dynamics.

To evaluate, we directly examine associations for market volatility and returns with lagged

values of *'87 Narratives*. As with the earlier tests, we account for serial correlations and correlations with other market-based indicators that may generate spurious correlations with *'87 Narratives*. Given that the outcome variables are only available on trading days, nontrading days are excluded for these tests. Additionally, we examine how the associations differ when accounting for conditional distributions. Given that stock market crashes are generally associated with large, unexpected spikes in market volatility, we use quantile regressions to evaluate the effects at different points of the distribution.

We find that crash narratives have a strong positive association with volatility the following day, and the effect diminishes over the subsequent days. Table 6 presents the results. Column (1) displays the results for the OLS regressions. *'87 Narrative* has a positive effect the day prior, though the effects reverse in subsequent days. We next consider the effects of crash narratives on the conditional volatility distribution. Again, we conjecture that the effects should be most pronounced at higher levels. Columns (2), (3), and (4) display the results at the 50<sup>th</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles, respectively. Across these columns, the initial effect of *'87 Narratives* become larger, and the effects persist much longer. These results suggest that crash narratives may amplify the effects of volatile periods.

We next examine the effects on market returns and find no significant association. Table 7 presents the results and is formatted similarly to Table 6. Columns (2), (3), and (4) present the quantile regression results and are associated with specifications at the 50<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, and 10<sup>th</sup> percentiles, respectively. Across the specifications, the coefficient for *'87 Narrative* is statistically insignificant at 10% for the day prior and mostly insignificant for earlier days. The results indicate that there are no significant effects on market returns.

#### **4. Investor Beliefs**

The results of the previous section suggest that crash narratives impact investor crash concerns and market dynamics. While potentially informative, the tests rely on a battery of controls in order to mitigate omitted variable issues that could bias the tests. However, these controls may not be sufficient to capture other fundamental factors impounded in market prices. In addition, the outcomes examined do not necessarily correspond with investor beliefs. Time variation in internet search volumes could reflect noninvestors as well.

We address these issues by performing tests on investor survey data. The data allow us to directly examine investor beliefs and utilize cross-sectional variation based on investor types. The survey responses include crash probability assessments that are directly comparable to estimates based on stock options data. We are able to identify two types of investors: individual and institutional. Because both sets of investors observe the same market conditions, any narrative effects associated with changes in fundamentals should be reflected in both. However, there is a large literature in behavioral finance suggesting that investor sophistication has an important role in mediating susceptibility to psychological biases, including reliance on narratives in belief formation. Based on these findings, we expect differential effects for individual investors and investors with relatively poor sophistication, allowing us to cleanly identify the effects of narratives.

For the outcome variable, we adjust the investor crash probabilities using information from the stock options market. We employ the methodology of Martin (2017) to estimate market-implied probabilities of a 15% decline in the S&P 500 over the next six months, which conforms to the parameters provided in the survey question. The survey data is adjusted using the option-implied crash probabilities, or  $\pi^{Adj}$ , by using the difference in log values based on information as of the survey response date.

Figure 5 displays the monthly averages of the crash probabilities for individual (red) and institutional (yellow) investors from the Shiller survey. Several observations stand out. First, the survey-based crash probabilities correspond closely with the option-implied crash probabilities (blue). The correlations between the individual (institutional) investor and option-implied crash probabilities are 47.1% (49.4%). Second, the survey-based crash probabilities are significantly larger than those based on options data, as noted in Goetzmann, Kim, and Shiller (2022). Based on the respondent-level data, the difference is 14.1% ( $t$ -value = 66.55) and 12.1% ( $t$ -value = 57.40) for individual and institutional investors, respectively. Third, the individual investor crash probabilities are significantly higher than those of institutional investors, based on parametric ( $t$ -value = 6.84) as well as nonparametric ( $z$ -value = 4.51) tests.

We estimate the following regression model separately for individual and institutional investors:

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi^{Adj}_{i,t} = & \gamma_1 \times '87 Narrative_{t-1} + \gamma_2 \times StockMarketAttention_{t-1} \\
& + \gamma_3 \times '87 Narrative_{t-1} \times StockMarketAttention_{t-1} \\
& + \gamma_4 \times W_{i,t-1} + \lambda^{DOW}_t + \lambda^{Year \times Month}_t + \zeta_{i,t}.
\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

The control variables ( $\mathbf{W}$ ) include previous-day market returns, past 30-day market returns, past 30-day market returns volatility, the average survey-based crash probabilities over the past 30 days, and the previous-day VIX. In order to distinguish immediate effects associated with narratives, we control for past 30-day averages of *'87 Narrative* and *StockMarketAttention*. In addition to these controls, we include two-fixed effects of the day-of-week and year-month levels. Robust standard errors clustered at the date level are used to calculate the test statistics.

We focus on the interaction term coefficient ( $\gamma_3$ ) and compare the estimates for the individual and institutional investor samples. For direct comparisons, we also present estimates from a pooled model augmented with interaction terms on a dummy associated with investor type.

#### 4.1 Results

We find evidence that crash narratives have a significant, positive relation to investor crash assessments. Table 8 displays the results. Columns (1) and (2) only include the *'87 Narrative* and *StockMarketAttention* terms for the individual and institutional investor subsamples, respectively. For the individual-investor subsample, the coefficient for uninteracted *'87 Narrative* is positive and marginally significant at the 10% level ( $\gamma_1$  estimate = 0.695,  $t$ -value = 1.88). The coefficient for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant ( $\gamma_3$  estimate = 0.688,  $t$ -value = 3.78). The results suggest that individual-investor crash probability assessments are higher in general when more attention is paid to the market, and also when heightened attention to the market coincides with higher crash narrativity in financial media. In contrast, for institutional investors, the *'87 Narrative* terms are statistically insignificant.

The differences in outcomes for individual versus institutional investors suggest that the effects of crash narratives that we detect may not simply be driven by fundamental conditions that may coincide with the prevalence of narratives in financial media. To further investigate, we alter the specifications in Columns (1) and (2) in the following manner. First, the dependent variable is replaced with the survey crash probability responses, which are adjusted using options data to

directly account for market information pertaining to a crash. That is, the dependent variable in these specifications is the difference between the crash probability from the survey and the option-implied crash probability. Second, control variables are included that account for other market information. Columns (3) and (4) display the results for individual and institutional investors, respectively. The results for individual investors remain similar. While the coefficient for the uninteracted '87 *Narrative* terms becomes statistically insignificant at the 10% level, the interaction terms remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level ( $\gamma_3$  estimate = 0.558,  $t$ -value = 3.01). The results are unchanged for the institutional investor subsample after including the control variables. Column (5) repeats the analysis using the pooled sample. The results are virtually identical.

#### 4.2 Recency

We next turn our attention to examining the effect of recency in narratives. To this end, we compare the results when using crash narratives based on the 1929 articles. Table 9 presents the results and is formatted similarly to Table 8. The coefficients for the '29 *Narrative* terms are mostly statistically insignificant across all the specifications, and none of the interaction terms are statistically significant. As with the crash attention tests, the results suggest that recency is a potentially important factor in conditioning the impact of narratives, possibly through their salience. However, as pointed out above, this may also be due to differences in the perceived outcomes of the two crashes.

#### 4.3 Term Frequency

It is unclear to what extent term frequency alone might be driving the results. We construct another measure that isolates the frequency of terms used in articles following the 1987 crash. '87 *Term Frequency* is the difference in cosine similarities between an article published on date  $t$  and articles published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987, based on term frequency-inverse document frequency. We use a weighted bag-of-words approach, given that previous studies demonstrate its performance is superior to that of unweighted approaches.

Table 10 presents the results and is formatted similarly to Table 8. The coefficients for the '87 *Term Frequency* interaction terms are statistically insignificant across all the specifications.

Interestingly, the uninteracted term coefficient is positive and statistically significant for the individual-investor subsample. In untabulated results, when augmenting the baseline models from Table 8 with '87 *Term Frequency* terms, the results remain significant and the coefficients are similar for the '87 *Narrative* terms. This suggests that term frequency by itself is not driving the results.

#### 4.4 Intra-article Saliency

We next use an alternative approach to examine the role of saliency. The tests rely on *StockMarketAttention* as a proxy for saliency. However, *StockMarketAttention* may be to some extent correlated with market-based crash indicators, making the results difficult to interpret. The correlations are generally higher at a monthly rather than daily frequency, which our analysis focuses on. We use an alternative approach to study the role of saliency that focuses on intra-article variation in narratives. Specifically, we use differences in information contained in the lede paragraph—the first 100 words of the article—versus other paragraphs. We assume that the information content is similar across the entire article, though readers are more likely to focus on the lede paragraph. Moreover, lede paragraphs in some cases include a dramatic thesis to engage readers to continue reading the article. Non-lede paragraphs may provide details supportive of this thesis. As such, non-lede paragraphs are more likely to capture fundamental conditions.

Because the machine-learning techniques used to construct the narrative measure perform relatively poorly on shorter documents, we extract narrative information in the lede paragraph in the following manner. We start by constructing an analogous narrative measure, or '87 *Narrative*<sup>Non-Lede</sup>, that excludes the first 100 words of each article. The average word count of the articles in our sample is 622.9, and so we believe that excluding the first 100 words will minimize degradation due to small document sizes. We then regress '87 *Narrative* onto the second-polynomial expansion of '87 *Narrative*<sup>Non-Lede</sup>, then define '87 *Narrative*<sup>Lede</sup> as the residual from this regression.

Table 11 displays the results. Columns (1) through (3) display the results using only '87 *Narrative*<sup>Lede</sup> as the narrative measure for the individual investor subsample, institutional investor subsample, and pooled sample specifications, respectively. The results are quantitatively similar to those in Table 8. Because '87 *Narrative*<sup>Lede</sup> is orthogonal to fundamental information that may be captured by non-lede paragraphs, by construction, the stability in the coefficients suggests that

most of the effects are unlikely to be driven by potentially unobservable fundamental factors. Finally, we augment the model with  $'87 \text{ Narrative}^{\text{Non-Lede}}$  terms to evaluate the sources of the main effects based on the full decomposition. Columns (4) through (6) display the results and are formatted similarly to Columns (1) through (3). We show that the effects are concentrated in the  $'87 \text{ Narrative}^{\text{Lede}}$  terms, while the  $'87 \text{ Narrative}^{\text{Non-Lede}}$  terms are statistically insignificant.

#### 4.5 Investor Narratives

The results from the previous section provide evidence that crash narratives propagated by the financial press have a mediating effect on investor beliefs. While they may be most relevant for crash assessments, crash narratives may have broader effects than what are captured in those tests.

We next examine how crash narratives may influence the types of narratives investors use to describe their general beliefs about the stock market. We do so by constructing tests based on free responses survey respondents are asked to provide. Specifically, investors are asked for general comments that may include an explanation for their responses to all the questions, including the crash assessment. We take the text responses and map them into document vectors based on the same model used for the WSJ articles. The document vectors are then used to estimate the similarity between the survey comments and newspaper articles that were published around the 1987 stock market crash. We call this measure *InvestorNarrative*.

We find evidence that crash narratives that appear in the financial press on the day prior may influence individual comments about the market. We do so by examining lead-lag relationships between  $'87 \text{ Narrative}$  and *InvestorNarrative*. Table 12 displays the results. Columns (1) and (2) are based on the individual investor subsample, while Columns (3) and (4) are based on the institutional investor subsample. Columns (2) and (4) include the full set of fixed effects and control variables used in Table 8. The table shows a positive and significant effect of  $'87 \text{ Narrative}$  on *InvestorNarrative* on the day prior, and there is mostly no significant effect on the earlier or later days. Moreover, these effects are only found in the individual investor subsample. All of the coefficients are statistically insignificant for the institutional investor subsample.

## 5. Folk Motifs and Crash Narratives

When is the financial press more likely to use higher narrativity? What is the relationship between '87 *Narrative* and general narrativity?

We consider narrativity using a measure that is unrelated to the stock market, the financial press, and even the modern era. Using a similar approach to '87 *Narrative*, we calculate the semantic-distribution similarities between WSJ articles and folktales published more than a century prior. Specifically, we use the complete corpus of *Grimm's Fairy Tales* Volumes 1 and 2, first published in 1812. The collection is based on the oral tradition of known fairy tales in German-speaking countries at the time and is cited as one of the founding texts of Western culture.<sup>25</sup> The version we obtain is an updated English translation by Margaret Hunt in 1884 (Grimm et al., 2014). The two volumes contain a total of 210 stories. We use the Doc2Vec model trained on the WSJ corpus to populate the feature vectors for each of the stories. The feature vector is then organized based on the TMI motif categories of each story. For each WSJ article, cosine similarities are calculated for all motif categories. We define *FolkMotif* as the average of the first principal component of these cosine similarities across all articles published on date  $t$ . We argue that *FolkMotif* captures the pure narrativity of articles, allowing us to evaluate the prevalence of narratives more generally.

Figure 6 displays monthly averages of *FolkMotifs*. '87 *Narratives* is also displayed for comparison. Both series are standard normalized. The correlation between the two measures is high—83.4% at a monthly frequency and 65.9% at a daily frequency. The high degree of correlation affirms our interpretation of '87 *Narratives*, namely that it is likely capturing narrativity rather than only terms associated with adverse fundamental conditions. The figure also suggests that historically, the financial press is more likely to use high narrativity during periods of extreme market stress and uncertainty. Interestingly, as with '87 *Narratives*, the narrativity of the financial press has increased in the post-2015 sample period. This period also coincides with greater prevalence of volatility spikes, raising questions about whether greater narrativity in media accounts may be influencing investor behavior or whether higher narrativity levels are reflective of other dynamics.

We formally examine whether narrativity corresponds with '87 *Crash*. We adapt the model from Equation (2) by using *FolkMotif* as the dependent variable. All specifications include the first

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. Auden (1944).

five lags of *FolkMotif* to account for serial correlations and restrict variations to its innovations. Table 13 displays the results. Column (1) displays the regression model results with only '87 *Narrative*, showing a positive and significant relationship. Column (2) features the interaction terms with *StockMarketAttention*. Both the interacted and uninteracted '87 *Narrative* term coefficients are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the narrativity of '87 *Crash* increases during periods of high investor attention. The uninteracted *StockMarketAttention* term coefficient is also positive and significant. This suggests that the financial press is more likely to use narrativity in newspaper articles when investor attention is higher, independent of whether they use crash narratives. One potential explanation is that the financial press serves broader readership during such periods, and journalists may rely on narrativity to make financial news more accessible.

Column (3) displays the results for the market-based crash indicators, excluding the '87 *Narrative* terms. It presents the sum of the coefficients over the lagged terms. It also shows  $p$ -values from the  $\chi^2$  statistics on the sum of the control variable coefficients. All but market turnover is statistically insignificant. This is notable because it suggests that the financial press does not generally use high narrativity to describe market conditions per se, although the significance of turnover, which is indicative of investor activity, may suggest narrative-related trading. Column (4) displays the full model. Here, the results on the '87 *Narrative* terms are similar to and even stronger than those of Column (2). Moreover, all the control variable coefficients become statistically insignificant at the 10% level. This provides evidence that the effects of crash narratives that we document in prior sections are unlikely to be due to unobservable fundamental heterogeneity. It also supports the validity of *FolkMotif* as an instrument for narrativity.

We revisit the tests in Equation (3) by replacing the '87 *Narrative* terms with *FolkMotif*. This allows us to directly assess the effects of narrativity on investor beliefs. Table 14 shows the results. We find an analogous effect in the individual investor subsample. Column (1) shows that the *FolkMotif* interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. We isolate components in *FolkMotif* related to crash narratives using a regression model that projects *FolkMotif* on the second-order polynomial transformation of '87 *Narrative*. This allows us to directly compare the effects of crash-related versus non-crash-related narratives. We find that only the component associated with the crash narrative measure is statistically significant. As with our other results, these results are only significant for the individual investor subsample and suggest

that the only forms of narratives that impact investor crash concerns are those associated with stock market crashes.

## 6. Conclusion

In this paper, we explore the role of narrative in investor attention and expectations when the probability of a major market crash is higher. We find that attention to the dynamics of the stock market is episodic and varies with measures of market uncertainty. We test the hypothesis that in such periods, interest in narratives is also high because stories are fundamentally concerned with state changes intermediated by events. In such times, investors undoubtedly look to the financial press to understand the causes and consequences of market dynamics. We show that, in these circumstances, history plays an important role in press narratives by bringing attention to past “rare disasters” in U.S. stock market history. In this sense, press narratives are a collective analogue to the powerful models of individual memory explored by recent research as a filter in decision-making under uncertainty. Collective and individual memory processes are not mutually exclusive—indeed, stories may also be a mechanism to perpetuate a particularly important event in individual memory.

We focus on the narrative aspect of this recall by constructing a crash narrative similarity score for the daily flow of stock market news in *The Wall Street Journal* since 1984. The variable interacts with attention to the market to explain individual predictions of a catastrophic stock market crash—but not so with institutional investor predictions, which are presumably better-informed opinions or perhaps less susceptible to influence by reference to (or recall of) a limited number of events in U.S. capital market history.

We address the challenge of separating narrative topics from “narrativity” in a couple of ways: first, by the use of an NLP approach that captures higher-order relationships across documents; and second, by using texts (i.e., fairy tales) whose topics are entirely orthogonal to financial themes. These folk motifs derive from archetypal tales that many people experience as children. We find that when public attention turns to the stock market, the resonance between financial news and fairy tales predicts higher individual crash forecasts. As the tale of the Andaman Islanders suggests, such behavior is not necessarily irrational. Stories can encode wisdom about a rare disaster in a memorable narrative.

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
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**Figure 1**

**Article Counts Citing the 1987 and 1929 Crashes**

This figure displays monthly counts of articles that reference the 1987 and 1929 stock market crashes. Data source: ProQuest.




**Figure 2**

**Crash Narratives and Market-based Crash Indicators**

This figure displays monthly averages of '87 Narrative, survey-based crash probabilities, and other market-based crash indicators from January 1987 through December 2020. '87 Narrative is the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987. The survey-based crash probabilities are from the Shiller survey. The market-based crash indicators include minimum daily market return for a given month, the volatility of the daily market returns, the average daily option-based crash probabilities, and the average daily VIX. All measures are standard normalized.


Data source: ProQuest, CBOE, Yale Investor Survey, CRSP, OptionMetrics.



**Figure 3**

**Crash Attention**


This figure displays monthly averages of '87 Narrative and Crash Attention from January 2005 through December 2020. '87 Narrative is the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987. Crash Attention is the Google Search Index for the search term “stock market crash.” All measures are standard normalized. Data sources: ProQuest, Google Trends



**Figure 4**

**1929 Crash Narratives**


This figure displays monthly averages of '87 Narrative and '29 Narrative from January 1987 through December 2020. '87 Narrative is the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987. '29 Narrative is the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 24 and November 8, 1929, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 7 and 23, 1929. All measures are standard normalized. Data source: ProQuest



**Figure 5**

**Survey-based Crash Probabilities**


This figure displays the survey-based crash probabilities based on individual and institutional investor subsamples, as well as the option-implied crash probabilities from January 1996 through December 2020. Data sources: Yale Investor Behavior Project, OptionMetrics



**Figure 6**

**Folk Motifs**

This figure displays monthly averages of '87 Narrative and Folk Motif from January 1987 through December 2020. '87 Narrative is the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987. FolkMotif is the first principal component of the cosine similarities of articles published on day  $t$  to folktales by motif categories. All measures are standard normalized. Data sources: ProQuest, Grimms Brothers Fairy Tales



**Table 1****Summary Statistics**

This table displays summary statistics for variables for the full data (Panel A) and the survey data (Panel B) tests. Data sources: ProQuest, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP, Yale Investor Behavior Project, Grimm Brothers Fairy Tales.

Panel A: Full Data					
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>25th Pctl.</u>	<u>50th Pctl.</u>	<u>75th Pctl.</u>
'87 Narrative	0.484	0.675	0.028	0.508	0.826
'29 Narrative	-0.065	0.850	-0.504	-0.116	0.444
StockMarketAttention	7.215	1.703	5.926	7.538	8.300
CrashAttention	0.976	1.365	0.000	0.000	2.079
VIX	19.375	8.633	13.350	16.580	22.810
$\pi^{\text{Option}}$	0.056	0.028	0.036	0.052	0.070
$R_M$	0.027	0.978	-0.349	0.049	0.517
$(R_M)^2$	0.011	0.025	0.000	0.002	0.009
Turnover	2.318	0.312	2.110	2.278	2.527
FolkMotif	0.382	0.956	-0.288	0.286	1.105
Panel B: Survey Data					
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>25th Pctl.</u>	<u>50th Pctl.</u>	<u>75th Pctl.</u>
$\pi$	0.167	0.153	0.049	0.095	0.223
$\pi^{\text{Adj}}$	0.109	0.152	-0.004	0.062	0.183
'87 Narrative	0.575	0.754	0.057	0.525	0.973
'29 Narrative	-0.018	0.977	-0.538	-0.039	0.538
StockMarketAttention	6.986	1.761	5.331	7.315	8.213
$R_M$	0.001	0.011	-0.004	0.001	0.006
Past Month Market Returns	0.011	0.058	-0.011	0.019	0.045
Market Return Volatility	0.010	0.007	0.006	0.008	0.012
Past Month $\pi$	0.200	0.055	0.165	0.196	0.232
VIX	19.538	8.992	13.490	17.110	22.500
FolkMotif	0.360	1.033	-0.306	0.246	0.944

**Table 2****Correlation Matrix**

This table displays Pearson correlation coefficients for '87 Narrative and market-based crash indicators. Panel A displays correlations using previous-day market factors. Panel B displays correlations based on the one-month changes in the variables. Data sources: ProQuest, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

Panel A: Pearson Correlations on '87 Narrative <sub>t+1</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	'87 Narrative <sub>t+1</sub>	VIX <sub>t</sub>	$\pi^{\text{Option}}_t$	R <sup>M</sup> <sub>t</sub>	(R <sup>M</sup> <sub>t</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>
VIX <sub>t</sub>	28.94%				
$\pi^{\text{Option}}_t$	26.23%	85.26%			
R <sup>M</sup> <sub>t</sub>	-8.72%	1.89%	-7.04%		
(R <sup>M</sup> <sub>t</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>	28.14%	43.78%	41.72%	-5.49%	
Turnover <sub>t</sub>	33.83%	18.29%	35.59%	-2.04%	26.11%

Panel B: Pearson Correlations on 30-day Changes					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$\Delta$ '87 Narrative <sub>t</sub>	$\Delta$ VIX <sub>t</sub>	$\Delta\pi^{\text{Option}}_t$	R <sup>M</sup> <sub>t-30,t</sub>	$\Delta(R^M_t)^2$
$\Delta$ VIX <sub>t</sub>	25.20%				
$\Delta\pi^{\text{Option}}_t$	15.88%	54.89%			
R <sup>M</sup> <sub>t-30,t</sub>	-2.31%	-9.50%	-4.17%		
$\Delta(R^M_t)^2$	11.54%	26.47%	21.96%	-3.85%	
$\Delta$ Turnover <sub>t</sub>	9.75%	22.67%	17.00%	2.65%	31.66%

**Table 3****Crash Narratives and Market-based Crash Indicators**

The dependent variables are '87 *Narrative*, defined as the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t+1$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987. Only data from January 1988 are used for these tests. Specifications that include the option-implied crash probabilities only use data from January 1996, due to data availability. Two-way fixed effects for month and day-of-week are included, but not reported. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable:	'87 Narrative <sub>t+1</sub>					
VIX <sub>t</sub>	0.253*** (0.013)					0.171*** (0.018)
$\pi^{\text{Option}}_t$		0.051*** (0.004)				-0.018*** (0.005)
R <sup>M</sup> <sub>t</sub>			-0.042*** (0.008)			-0.032*** (0.006)
(R <sup>M</sup> <sub>t</sub> ) <sup>2</sup>				7.071*** (0.377)		2.347*** (0.340)
Turnover <sub>t</sub>					0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Month and Day-of-week FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	12,784	9,858	12,784	12,784	12,784	9,858
R <sup>2</sup>	14.0%	13.3%	6.6%	10.9%	22.6%	21.3%

**Table 4****Crash Narratives and Attention**

The dependent variables are *Crash Attention*, or the Google search volume index for “stock market crash,” and *Crash Attention (Dummy)*, or the dummy coded as 1 on days where the search volume index for “stock market crash” is nonzero and 0 otherwise. The main explanatory variables are as follows: *'87 Narrative* (the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987); *StockMarketAttention* (the Google search volume index for stock market-related terms on day  $t$ ); and the interaction between *'87 Narrative* and *StockMarketAttention*. The control variables are included where indicated, but they are not reported. They include values for days  $t-4$  through  $t$  for the *Crash Attention*, VIX, option-implied crash probabilities, turnover, market returns, and market returns squared. Two-way fixed effects for month and day of week are included where indicated, but they are not reported. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	<u>Crash</u> <u>Attention<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>Crash</u> <u>Attention<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>Crash</u> <u>Attention<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>Crash</u> <u>Attention</u> <u>(Dummy)<sub>t+1</sub></u>
'87 Narrative <sub>t</sub>	8.790*** (2.446)	5.739** (2.709)	5.618** (2.847)	6.971*** (1.032)
StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>		0.124*** (0.015)	0.104*** (0.016)	0.137*** (0.007)
'87 Narrative <sub>t</sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>		4.334*** (1.192)	4.515*** (1.216)	2.078*** (0.440)
Lagged <i>Crash Attention</i> Terms	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control Variables	NO	NO	YES	YES
Month and Day-of-week FEs	NO	NO	YES	YES
N	6,268	6,268	6,264	6,265
R <sup>2</sup>	19.9%	21.0%	22.3%	28.2%

**Table 5****Recency**

The dependent variables are *Crash Attention*, or the Google search volume index for “stock market crash,” and *Crash Attention (Dummy)*, or the dummy coded as 1 on days where the search volume index for “stock market crash” is non-zero and 0 otherwise. The main explanatory variables include the following: *'29 Narrative* (the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 24 and November 8, 1929, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 7 and 23, 1929); *StockMarketAttention* (the Google search volume index for stock market-related terms on day  $t$ ); and the interaction between *'29 Narrative* and *StockMarketAttention*. The control variables are included where indicated, but they are not reported. They include values for days  $t-4$  through  $t$  for the *Crash Attention*, VIX, option-implied crash probabilities, turnover, market returns, and market returns squared. Two-way fixed effects for month and day of week are included where indicated, but they are not reported. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	<u>Crash Attention<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>Crash Attention<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>Crash Attention<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>Crash Attention (Dummy)<sub>t+1</sub></u>
'29 Narrative <sub>t</sub>	3.610** (1.793)	1.720 (2.044)	1.110 (2.069)	1.169 (0.742)
StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>		0.137*** (0.014)	0.120*** (0.015)	0.151*** (0.006)
'29 Narrative <sub>t</sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>		0.296 (0.923)	0.086 (0.911)	-0.180 (0.327)
Lagged <i>Crash Attention</i> Terms	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control Variables	NO	NO	YES	YES
Month and Day-of-week FEs	NO	NO	YES	YES
N	6,268	6,268	6,264	6,265
R <sup>2</sup>	19.8%	20.9%	22.1%	27.7%

**Table 6****Market Volatility**

The dependent variable is the daily VIX. The main explanatory variable is '87 *Narrative*, defined as the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987. Column (1) displays the results for the OLS regressions, while Columns (2) through (4) display the results for the quantile regressions. The quantiles used for Columns (2), (3), and (4) are the 50<sup>th</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles, respectively. The control variables include values for days  $t-5$  through  $t$  for the VIX, turnover, market returns, and market returns squared. Two-way fixed effects for month and day of week are included where indicated, but not reported. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses in Column (1), and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses in Columns (2) through (4). Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Estimator:</u>	<u>OLS</u>	<u>Q(0.5)</u>	<u>Q(0.75)</u>	<u>Q(0.9)</u>
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	<u>VIX<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>VIX<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>VIX<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>VIX<sub>t+1</sub></u>
'87 Narrative <sub>t</sub>	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.004)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-2</sub>	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-3</sub>	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-4</sub>	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.003)
Control Variables	YES	YES	YES	YES
Month and Day-of-week FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	4,275	4,275	4,275	4,275

**Table 7****Market Returns**

The dependent variables are daily market returns. The main explanatory variable is '87 Narrative, defined as the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987. Column (1) display the results for the OLS regressions, while Columns (2) through (4) display the results for the quantile regressions. The quantiles used for Columns (2), (3), and (4) are the 50<sup>th</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup>, and 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles, respectively. The control variables include values for days  $t-5$  through  $t$  for the VIX, turnover, market returns, and market returns squared. Two-way fixed effects for month and day of week are included where indicated, but they are not reported. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses in Column (1), and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses in Columns (2) through (4). Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Estimator:</u>	OLS	Q(0.5)	Q(0.25)	Q(0.1)
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	$R^M_{t+1}$	$R^M_{t+1}$	$R^M_{t+1}$	$R^M_{t+1}$
'87 Narrative <sub>t</sub>	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.026 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.033)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.003 (0.019)	0.000 (0.017)	0.002 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.033)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-2</sub>	0.035* (0.020)	0.020 (0.016)	0.029 (0.022)	0.017 (0.032)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.002 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.016)	0.022 (0.021)	0.067** (0.030)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-4</sub>	0.024 (0.020)	0.029** (0.014)	0.024 (0.025)	0.001 (0.033)
Control Variables	YES	YES	YES	YES
Month and Day-of-week Fes	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	4,275	4,275	4,275	4,275

**Table 8****Investor Crash Probabilities**

The dependent variables are the survey-based crash probabilities, both adjusted and unadjusted using option-implied crash probabilities. The analysis is performed using only the subsample of individual investors, institutional investors, or both, as indicated in the second row. The main explanatory variables include the following: '87 *Narrative* (the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987); *StockMarketAttention* (the Google search volume index for stock market-related terms on day  $t$ ); and the interaction between '87 *Narrative* and *StockMarketAttention*. The control variables include lagged values of the VIX, turnover, market returns, market returns squared, past 30-day market returns, past 30-day market returns volatility, the average survey-based crash probabilities over the past 30 days, the average '87 *Narrative* over the past 30 days, and the average *StockMarketAttention* over the past 30 days. Two-way fixed effects for month and day of week are included where indicated, but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the date level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Yale Investor Behavior Project, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<u>Investor Subsample:</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>All</u>
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	$\pi_{i,t+1}$	$\pi_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{\text{Adj}}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{\text{Adj}}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{\text{Adj}}_{i,t+1}$
'87 <i>Narrative</i> <sub><math>t</math></sub>	1.529*** (0.306)	0.861*** (0.308)	-0.084 (0.394)	-0.257 (0.382)	0.231 (0.347)
<i>StockMarketAttention</i> <sub><math>t</math></sub>	0.006*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)
'87 <i>Narrative</i> <sub><math>t</math></sub> × <i>StockMarketAttention</i> <sub><math>t</math></sub>	0.697*** (0.162)	0.074 (0.156)	0.504*** (0.180)	-0.133 (0.157)	0.566*** (0.169)
Institutional <sub><math>i</math></sub>					-0.025*** (0.003)
Institutional <sub><math>i</math></sub> × '87 <i>Narrative</i> <sub><math>t</math></sub>					-0.002 (0.002)
Institutional <sub><math>i</math></sub> × <i>StockMarketAttention</i> <sub><math>t</math></sub>					-0.768* (0.427)
Institutional <sub><math>i</math></sub> × '87 <i>Narrative</i> <sub><math>t</math></sub> × <i>StockMarketAttention</i> <sub><math>t</math></sub>					-0.740*** (0.215)
Control Variables	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month and Day-of-week FEs	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
N	7,271	6,284	7,270	6,282	13,555
R <sup>2</sup>	1.0%	0.3%	6.2%	6.9%	3.9%

**Table 9****Investor Crash Probabilities and 1929 Crash Narratives**

The dependent variables are the survey-based crash probabilities, both adjusted and unadjusted using option-implied crash probabilities. The analysis is performed using only the subsample of individual investors, institutional investors, or both, as indicated in the second row. The main explanatory variables include the following: *'29 Narrative* (the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 24 and November 8, 1929, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 7 and 23, 1929); *StockMarketAttention* (the Google search volume index for stock market–related terms on day  $t$ ); and the interaction between *'29 Narrative* and *StockMarketAttention*. The control variables are identical to those used in Table 8. Robust standard errors clustered at the date level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Yale Investor Behavior Project, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<u>Investor Subsample:</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>All</u>
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	$\pi_{i,t+1}$	$\pi_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{\text{Adj}}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{\text{Adj}}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{\text{Adj}}_{i,t+1}$
'29 Narrative <sub><math>t</math></sub>	0.498** (0.226)	0.765*** (0.223)	-0.083 (0.253)	0.204 (0.237)	-0.061 (0.236)
StockMarketAttention <sub><math>t</math></sub>	0.006*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)
'29 Narrative <sub><math>t</math></sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub><math>t</math></sub>	0.282** (0.116)	0.185* (0.107)	0.123 (0.116)	-0.019 (0.106)	0.116 (0.115)
Institutional <sub><math>i</math></sub>					-0.022*** (0.003)
Institutional <sub><math>i</math></sub> × '29 Narrative <sub><math>t</math></sub>					-0.003 (0.002)
Institutional <sub><math>i</math></sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub><math>t</math></sub>					0.311 (0.315)
Institutional <sub><math>i</math></sub> × '29 Narrative <sub><math>t</math></sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub><math>t</math></sub>					-0.178 (0.156)
Control Variables	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month and Day-of-week FEs	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
N	7,271	6,284	7,270	6,282	13,555
R <sup>2</sup>	0.6%	0.3%	6.0%	6.9%	3.8%

**Table 10****'87 Term Frequency**

The dependent variables are the survey-based crash probabilities, both adjusted and unadjusted using option-implied crash probabilities. The analysis is performed using only the subsample of individual investors, institutional investors, or both, as indicated in the second row. The main explanatory variables include the following: *'87 TermFrequency* (the cosine similarity of articles published on day  $t$  to those published between October 20 and 23, 1987, minus the cosine similarity to those published between October 5 and 9, 1987, based on the term frequency-inverse document frequency); *StockMarketAttention* (the Google search volume index for stock market-related terms on day  $t$ ); and the interaction between *'87 TermFrequency* and *StockMarketAttention*. The control variables are identical to those used in Table 8. Robust standard errors clustered at the date level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Yale Investor Behavior Project, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<u>Investor Subsample:</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>All</u>
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	$\pi_{i,t+1}$	$\pi_{i,t+1}$	$\pi_{i,t+1}^{Adj}$	$\pi_{i,t+1}^{Adj}$	$\pi_{i,t+1}^{Adj}$
'87 TermFrequency <sub>t</sub>	0.616*** (0.160)	0.195 (0.156)	0.363* (0.188)	-0.096 (0.184)	0.395** (0.172)
StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
'87 TermFrequency <sub>t</sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>	0.110 (0.076)	0.105 (0.070)	-0.037 (0.087)	0.067 (0.080)	0.056 (0.080)
Institutional <sub>i</sub>					-0.022*** (0.003)
Institutional <sub>i</sub> × '87 TermFrequency <sub>t</sub>					0.000 (0.002)
Institutional <sub>i</sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>					-0.515** (0.216)
Institutional <sub>i</sub> × '87 TermFrequency <sub>t</sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>					-0.053 (0.100)
Control Variables	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month and Day-of-week FEs	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
N	7,271	6,284	7,270	6,282	13,555
R <sup>2</sup>	0.7%	0.1%	7.6%	8.4%	4.5%

**Table 11****Intra-article Salience**

The dependent variables are the survey-based crash probabilities adjusted using option-implied crash probabilities. The analysis is performed using only the subsample of individual investors, institutional investors, or both, as indicated in the second row. '87  $Narrative^{Lede}$  is the residual cosine similarity of '87  $Narrative$  when using only articles excluding the first 100 words, and '87  $Narrative^{Non-Lede}$  is the predicted cosine similarity of '87  $Narrative$  when using only articles excluding the first 100 words. The control variables are identical to those used in Table 8. Robust standard errors clustered at the date level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Yale Investor Behavior Project, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>Investor Subsample:</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>All</u>
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$
'87 $Narrative^{Lede}_t$	-0.268 (0.428)	-0.249 (0.442)	0.221 (0.411)	-0.350 (0.442)	-0.196 (0.454)	-0.108 (0.436)
StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>	0.002 (0.004)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
'87 $Narrative^{Lede}_t \times$ StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>	0.462** (0.192)	-0.136 (0.170)	0.562*** (0.192)	0.402** (0.187)	-0.126 (0.183)	0.426** (0.187)
Institutional <sub>i</sub>			-0.025*** (0.004)			-0.025*** (0.004)
Institutional <sub>i</sub> $\times$ '87 $Narrative^{Lede}_t$			-0.002 (0.002)			-0.001 (0.002)
Institutional <sub>i</sub> $\times$ StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>			-0.845* (0.511)			-0.230 (0.511)
Institutional <sub>i</sub> $\times$ '87 $Narrative^{Lede}_t \times$ StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>			-0.777*** (0.259)			-0.563** (0.241)

**Table 11 (cont.)**

'87 Narrative <sup>NonLede</sup> <sub>t</sub>				0.683 (0.502)	-0.940* (0.493)	0.641 (0.465)
'87 Narrative <sup>NonLede</sup> <sub>t</sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>				0.216 (0.272)	0.008 (0.266)	0.312 (0.265)
Institutional <sub>i</sub> × '87 Narrative <sup>NonLede</sup> <sub>t</sub>						-1.424** (0.601)
Institutional <sub>i</sub> × '87 Narrative <sup>NonLede</sup> <sub>t</sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>						-0.365 (0.401)
Control Variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month and Day-of-week FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	7,270	6,282	13,555	7,270	6,282	13,555
R <sup>2</sup>	7.7%	8.4%	4.6%	7.7%	8.5%	4.7%

**Table 12****Investor Narratives**

The dependent variables are the cosine similarities between the survey comments and articles published between October 20 and 23, 1987, or *Investor Narrative*. The analysis is performed using only the subsample of individual investors or institutional investors, as indicated in the second row. The main explanatory variable is lead and lag values of '87 *Narrative*. The control variables are identical to those of Table 8. Robust standard errors clustered at the date level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Yale Investor Behavior Project, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Investor Subsample:</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	<u>Investor</u> <u>Narrative<sub>i,t</sub></u>	<u>Investor</u> <u>Narrative<sub>i,t</sub></u>	<u>Investor</u> <u>Narrative<sub>i,t</sub></u>	<u>Investor</u> <u>Narrative<sub>i,t</sub></u>
'87 Narrative <sub>t+3</sub>	-0.028 (0.046)	-0.039 (0.046)	-0.018 (0.046)	-0.026 (0.047)
'87 Narrative <sub>t+2</sub>	0.055 (0.043)	0.046 (0.043)	0.035 (0.049)	0.032 (0.049)
'87 Narrative <sub>t+1</sub>	0.023 (0.044)	0.004 (0.045)	-0.010 (0.052)	-0.012 (0.053)
'87 Narrative <sub>t</sub>	0.012 (0.043)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.009 (0.049)	-0.008 (0.050)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-1</sub>	0.126*** (0.039)	0.112*** (0.041)	-0.017 (0.034)	-0.027 (0.035)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-2</sub>	0.007 (0.039)	0.015 (0.040)	-0.008 (0.038)	0.002 (0.039)
'87 Narrative <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.037 (0.042)	-0.027 (0.042)	-0.013 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.045)
Control Variables	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year-Month and Day-of-week FEs	NO	YES	NO	YES
N	4,411	4,408	3,246	3,232
R <sup>2</sup>	4.7%	4.8%	4.4%	4.7%

**Table 13****Folk Motifs and Crash Narratives**

The dependent variables are *FolkMotif*, or the first principal component of the cosine similarities of articles published on day  $t$  to folktales by motif categories. The control variables include values for days  $t-4$  through  $t$  for the *FolkMotif*, VIX, option-implied crash probabilities, market returns, market returns squared, and turnover. The sum of the coefficients for each of the control variables is reported where indicated. Two-way fixed effects for month and day of week are included where indicated, but they are not reported. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. The  $p$ -values for the  $\chi^2$  statistics on the sum of the control variable coefficients are reported in brackets. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Grimm Brothers Fairy Tales, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	<u>FolkMotif<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>FolkMotif<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>FolkMotif<sub>t+1</sub></u>	<u>FolkMotif<sub>t+1</sub></u>
'87 Narrative <sub>t</sub>	0.096*** (0.017)	0.066*** (0.019)		0.098*** (0.021)
StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>		0.066*** (0.016)		0.098*** (0.020)
'87 Narrative <sub>t</sub> x StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>		0.073*** (0.013)		0.075*** (0.013)
Lagged Option Crash Probability Coefficients			-0.033 [0.50]	-0.016 [0.12]
Lagged VIX Coefficients			-0.014 [0.08]	-0.013 [0.07]
Lagged Market Return Coefficients			-0.024 [0.25]	-0.057 [1.49]
Lagged Market Return <sup>2</sup> Coefficients			0.012 [0.19]	-0.038 [2.38]
Lagged Turnover Coefficients			0.062** [5.27]	-0.011 [0.13]
Lagged <i>FolkMotif</i> Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Month and Day-of-week FEs	NO	NO	YES	YES
N	4,275	4,275	4,275	4,275
R <sup>2</sup>	16.6%	17.7%	15.2%	18.3%

**Table 14****Folk Motifs and Investor Crash Probabilities**

The dependent variables are the survey-based crash probabilities adjusted using option-implied crash probabilities. The analysis is performed using only the subsample of individual investors or institutional investors, as indicated in the second row. *FolkMotif* is the first principal component of the cosine similarities of articles published on day  $t$  to folktales by motif categories.  $FolkMotif^{Crash}$  is the predicted values of a regression that projects *FolkMotif* on the second-order polynomial expansion of '87 Narratives, while  $FolkMotif^{Non-crash}$  is the residual. The control variables are identical to those used in Table 8. Robust standard errors clustered at the date level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significances for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by

\*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Data sources: ProQuest, Grimm Brothers Fairy Tales, Yale Investor Behavior Project, Google Trends, CBOE, OptionMetrics, CRSP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Investor Subsample:</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>Indiv.</u>	<u>Inst.</u>
<u>Dependent Variable:</u>	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$	$\pi^{Adj}_{i,t+1}$
FolkMotif <sub>t</sub>	0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)		
StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>	0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)		
FolkMotif <sub>t</sub> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>	0.003** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)		
FolkMotif <sub>t</sub> <sup>Crash</sup>			-0.002 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)
FolkMotif <sub>t</sub> <sup>Crash</sup> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>			0.006*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
FolkMotif <sub>t</sub> <sup>Non-crash</sup>			0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)
FolkMotif <sub>t</sub> <sup>Non-crash</sup> × StockMarketAttention <sub>t</sub>			0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)
Control Variables	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year-Month and Day-of-week FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	7,270	6,282	7,270	6,282
R <sup>2</sup>	7.59%	8.46%	7.69%	8.46%